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introduction, for the student, to the time scale for the
Mesoamerican development, has to be very close to the time scale
for the Near East story. In Foundations, we have been able to
write some reasonably proper stories for their respective social
evolutions, at perhaps 2,000 year intervals, for the period from 22
kya to the present, not by typology but by dynamics.
Arthur S. Iberall

Stephen K. Sanderson. Social Evolutionism: A Critical History.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990.
We have entered a new stage in civilizational studies, if recent
research and thinking by such as Frank and Gills, Chase-Dunn
and Hall, and Sanderson are as eye-opening as appears to me to
be the case. Apparently I am not alone in this opinion, as Albert
Bergesen thinks we are experiencing a Kuhnian paradigm crisis. 1
The "Big Picture" is what has always held great attraction for
me. I pursued graduate training in geography because it provided a comprehensive and comprehensible approach to the entire
planet Earth. I looked to Marxism to provide a broad understanding of human society, but gradually became appreciative of
its several serious shortcomings. I supplemented my geographic
interests by tapping into sociology, anthropology, and history,
while seeking a more realistic (and sufficiently broad and comprehensive) conceptual frame of reference replacing Marxism and
its antiquated competitors. In this search, I was drawn to the
ISCSC with its breadth of concerns, topical and temporal.
Consequently, recent scholarly approaches which focus on societal evolution and world systems have come to my attention.
These seem to me to lay the foundation, or provide the framework, for significant progress in our understanding of the human
experience all the way from Sumer and Egypt and their first cities
and states to the present.
As an unabashed generalist gathering insights and information from diverse sources, I am quite dependent on the specialists
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and respect their devotion to detail greatly, but all that careful diligence produces little of value for me unless the details thus garnered can be meaningfully placed in some general conceptual
structure. No Big Picture is ever completed or perfected, but
without one I am lost among profusions and cacophonies. Micro
and macro as well as medial scales of research are all essential to
our quest for understanding, but my preferred scale remains that
of the macro, despite postmodernist disdain of "meta-narratives".
The focus of this paper is Stephen K. Sanderson's ambitious
Social Evolutionism: A Critical History. This work accomplishes
the task the author set for himself, to wit: "the book before you
will survey the broad range of evolutionary theories in the social
sciences, compare and contrast them to each other, and critically
examine their logical and epistemological foundations" (xvii),
and so it does. It is "a critical history, not a critical history." (p.7)
He begins with the classical evolutionists, Spencer, Morgan and
Tylor, followed by a chapter devoted to the anti-evolutionary
views of Franz Boas & Co., and then a chapter on Marxism in
relation to evolutionary thinking. This is followed by a critical
discussion of V.G. Childe, Leslie White, and Julian Steward, and
a chapter dissecting the views of Talcott Parsons. After Boas,
Childe, White and Steward represented an "evolutionary revival".
Evolutionary thinking among anthropologists since 1960
constitutes Chapter 7, followed by a chapter carefully exploring
the relationship (and lack of!) of biological and social evolutionism. The penultimate chapter deals with the criticisms of evolution by Mandelbaum, Nisbet and Giddens. The book closes with
a brief statement entitled "Toward a Comprehensive Theory of
Sociocultural Evolution" with a nine-point general guide as to
what such a theory needs and should avoid. This leaves one eager
for his next book.
Sanderson's practice of including pertinent quotations from
the writings of the scholars whose views he is analyzing is a very
useful characteristic of his work, and his mastery of the relevant
literature is impressive.
Sanderson realized, in the 1970s, that evolution was not only
a hotly contended idea, but was plagued with vagueness and
markedly different meanings among those who had entered the
lists for or against it. I, for one, am thankful for his exploration
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and analysis. He has provided a much-needed, systematic treatment of the complex arguments and contradictory claims associated with social evolution.
My introduction to the question was heavily influenced by
political theory, with which Sanderson is not concerned. Radical
political theorists have devoted generations of effort in defense of
revolutionism or reformism. Perhaps with a more sociological
view of history, and less investment in Marxist polemics, they
might have noticed that the prevalent mode of change in human
societies is one of almost imperceptible, or at least minor, modifications over long periods of time: to wit, reform, or evolution,
with revolution—rapid, abrupt changes—occurring rarely and
never accomplishing the total restructuring of society that the revolutionaries had expected. This use of "evolutionary", meaningful for me, especially in the past, is, of course, not what Sanderson
has in mind. He is thinking at a different scale in a different context, where evolution refers to major structural changes.
This raises many questions which it is not practical to explore
in this paper, alas: questions of teleology and its relation to directionality, to unlinearity and multilinearity, exogenous versus
endogenous sources of change, reification, reductionism, and several others, all of which receive Sanderson's careful attention.
Sanderson devotes significant effort to disabusing his readers of
the presumed connection of progress and evolution. I am not
quite certain as to why he wants an "absolute" measure of
improvement before accepting the concept "progress," or why
there should be "steady human progress" to legitimate the use of
this term. Perhaps my problem is that too much has been loaded
onto this word. Of course, there has not been steady progress. Of
course, progress in one aspect of human life cannot be generalized to the totality of human life. Of course, too, value judgments
cannot be avoided. Like most Westerners, I am not a fatalist, and
if deprived of the hope of progress, of improvement, in at least
some aspects of life, the value of life itself is diminished. Be that
as it may, contentious "progress," I must reluctantly agree, be
excluded from discussions of evolution.
I do question, however, Sanderson's insistence that changeagents are always individuals and not collectivities. To be sure,
there has been entirely too much written in a reified style — "The
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working class acted," "Germany responded," "Iroquois society
needed," and the like. Such high-order abstractions are not operational units and therefore cannot DO anything. However, few
individuals, acting on their own, decide much of anything of significance. Anyone who has served on a committee, whether the
board of directors of a corporation, or a jury, or the leadership circle of a voluntary association (the list of examples could be
extended ad nauseam) has participated in collective decisionmaking. It does not follow that the group decision was identical
in all particulars to the decision of individual group members had
they decided entirely on their own and not in concert. And such
collective decisions are real and have real consequences.
Fortunately, "Have we evolved or not, and how?" does not hang
on Sanderson's autonomous, monadic change-agents.
The question of societal evolution—what meaning shall we
assign to this term? how inclusive is it? how helpful? —is basic,
for civilizationists cannot avoid the puzzle that societal dynamics
presents. Hence the "rise and fall" theories, the "stimuli and
responses," Sorokin's ideational stages, and the Marxist "motor of
history". Sanderson, in this volume, does not provide the magic
solution, but he certainly puts our feet firmly on the ground as far
as societal evolutionary concepts are concerned.
Laurence Grambow Wolf
NOTE
Albert Bergesen, "Let's Be Frank About World History," in Civilizations and
World Systems, Stephen K. Sanderson, ed., Altamira Press, 1995, p. 197.
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